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ABSTRACT
Network density, membership fees and service are analytically related to factors such as the size
of the target population, the distribution of ability to enjoy the network’s service within the target
population, the tax-rebate rate on membership payment, the service production costs, which are
increased by congestion or reduced by agglomeration, and the network organisational costs.
The analysis is conducted for the cases of monopolistic and duopolistic profit-maximising
networks and for the case of a monopolistic budget-balancing and density-targeting network.
JEL classification: D20, L20
Keywords: Network density, membership fee and service.

____________________
* The author is indebted to the participants of the Seventeenth Economic Theory Workshop
hosted by the University of Melbourne in February 1999 for helpful comments on an earlier
draft.
Corresponding author: Amnon Levy, Department of Economics, University of Wollongong,
Northfields Avenue, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia. Tel: 61-2-42213658 or 61-242258244, Fax: 61-2-42213725, E-mail: amnon_levy@uow.edu.au

1

I. INTRODUCTION
The term network is used in this paper to indicate the affiliation of people with a common
interest in a service to an organisation which makes that service equally accessible to members.
The networks considered in this paper generate revenues by collecting a uniform membership
fee for accessing their service. In addition to fixed costs, they incur the variable costs of
producing their service, organisational costs of billing and communicating with members, and
congestion costs and enjoy agglomeration benefits. The quality of the service depends on the
networks’ membership fees and objective. It is also affected by size externalities that can be
positive in the case of a dominant agglomeration effect or negative in the case of a dominant
1
congestion effect.
These organisations of common interest groups can be generally classified as social networks or
economic networks. Much of the literature on networks deals with social networks and is
written from a sociological perspective. A survey of that strand of literature is provided by
Wellman and Berkowitz (1988). A brief survey of the economic literature on networks is
provided by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), who analysed the stability and efficiency of social
2
and economic networks within a cooperative game framework.
The main contribution of this paper to the network literature is the theoretical derivation of
possible relationships between networks’ density, membership fees and service. Membership
fees and the ability to enjoy the network’s service are incorporated into the individual’s decision
of joining a network. A critical ingredient in modeling this decision, and consequently network
density, is that people have different levels of ability to enjoy a network service. That is, despite
being simultaneously and equally offered, a network service appeals to some people more than
to others and hence a considerable variation in people’s willingness to pay for an identical
service can be expected.
The distribution of the ability to enjoy the network service in a given population, and factors
such as membership fees and tax concessions, determine the network density. In turn, network
density affects both the network revenues, organisational and congestion costs and
agglomeration benefits. These interdependencies are conceptually integrated into the analysis of
the determination of membership fees and service.
The analysis is focused on two specific types of networks: profit-maximising networks in a
monopolistic and duopolistic frameworks, and budget-balancing and density-targeting
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monopolistic networks. The ownership and management of profit-maximising networks are
likely to be separated from their members, whereas the budget-balancing and density-targeting
networks are usually owned by their members and managed by democratically elected
committees. Examples of profit-maximising networks are Internet subscriber’s networks,
matching agencies and private medical funds. Examples of budget-balancing and densitytargeting networks are trade unions, co-ops, and professional, social, cultural and ethnic clubs.
Budget-balancing represents a possible financial policy for non-profit networks, and density3
targeting may serve these networks for increasing their bargaining and lobbying power.
The paper is organised as follows. The membership decision and the minimum ability to enjoy
the network service required for joining the network are described in section II. The minimum
ability to enjoy the network’s service is subsequently used for analysing the density of a
monopolistic network in section III. Profit-maximising membership fees and service and their
properties are derived in section IV for the monopolistic network case. Membership fees and
service are also generated for a budget-balancing and density-targeting monopolistic network in
section V. The analysis is extended to the more complicated case of two non-identical rival
networks in section VI. The effects of the a network’s own choice, and the rival’s choice, of
membership fees and service on its density are analysed. The Cournot-equilibrium membership
fees and service were described for profit-maximising networks. Conclusions are summarised in
section VII.

II. MEMBERSHIP DECISION AND THE MINIMUM ABILITY TO ENJOY
NETWORK’S SERVICE
It is assumed that people make decisions on membership in a network by comparing the
periodical membership fee set by the network to their evaluation of the periodical service
provided by the network. In addition to this conventional wisdom, the modeling of the
membership decision incorporates people’s ability to enjoy the network service on a zero-one
scale and the upper-bound on people’s willingness to pay for that service. This approach to
modeling the membership decision is chosen so as to facilitate the subsequent sections’ analysis
of network density.
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Similarly to Levy (1998), let S denote a combined index of the quantity and quality of the
periodical service offered by a network to its members. Let the willingness to pay for S of an
individual member i be a fraction of the highest willingness to pay for that service within the
population:

pi = θi pmax ( S )
where

θi ∈( 0,1) indicates the

network and

pmax ( S )

(1)

i-th member ability to enjoy the service provided by the

the upper-bound on members’ willingness to pay for the periodical

service offered by the network. This upper-bound rises with S (i.e.,

p'max > 0 ).

Despite

being simultaneously and equally offered, the network service appeals to some people more
than to others because of differences in preferences, incomes, familiarity, skills and attributes
needed for using the network and strategic behaviour.
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Let m denote the periodical network membership fee, and t the tax-rebate rate applicable in
some countries for membership in some networks (e.g., professional associations and trade
unions) and assumed, for simplicity, to be the same for all members. We may expect an
individual i to be a member of a network as long as his, or her, willingness to pay for

S

is not

lower than the tax-rebate adjusted membership fee:

θi pmax ( S ) ≥ (1 − t ) m .

(2)

This membership rule implies that the minimum level of ability to enjoy the network service
within the group of the network members rises with the membership fee in accordance with the
following linear equation
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 1− t 
θmin = 
m
p
(
S
)
 max

where

(3)

pmax ( S ) is calibrated so that 0 ≤ θmin ≤ 1.

III. NETWORK DENSITY AND THE FEASIBLE MEMBERSHIP FEE-SERVICE
SET
For simplicity, let us first consider the case of a monopolistic network. The network density is
defined as the ratio of the number of the network’s members (M) to the target population (L).
Recalling equation 3, the density of the network can be rendered as

M
=
L

where

f (θ i )

1

∫ f (θi ) di

(4)

 1− t 
p
m
 max ( S ) 

is the probability density function of the ability to enjoy the network service

within the population. Let this probability density function be uniform,
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then the network’s

density can be expressed as

 1− t 
M
= 1− 
 m.
L
 pmax ( S ) 

(5)

A hundred per cent network density is reached when either the membership fee goes to zero or
the upper-bound on members’ willingness to pay for the network service goes to infinity. The
positive scalar

(1− t ) / pmax ( S )

can be interpreted as the aggregate propensity to

withdraw the membership in the network as the membership-fee rises. This membership
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withdrawal inclination is moderated by the tax-rebate rate and the upper-bound on the
members’ willingness to pay for the service provided by the network.

The

network-density

equation

implies

that

the

empty-network

set,

{( m, S ) ∈ R+2 : M = 0} , comprises all the membership fees and service combinations that
satisfy the following equality

S M = 0 = pmax −1 ((1 − t ) m) .
Recalling the assumption that

p'max > 0 ,

(6)

the corresponding empty-network curve is

positively sloped in the first orthan spanned by m and S. To simplify the following sections’
analyses, let the upper-bound on members’ willingness to pay be linear in the network service

pmax ( S ) = vS

(7)

where v is a positive scalar indicating the upper-bound on members’ marginal willingness to pay
for the service provided by the network. Then, the empty-network combinations of m and S
should satisfy

1− t
S M=0 = 
 m.
 v 

(8)

Consequently, the network’s feasible set of membership fees and service is the region above
this empty-network line (ENL) as depicted by Figure 1.
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S

Feasible combinations
(M>0)

0

ENL

m

Figure 1. The empty-network line and feasible combinations

IV. MEMBERSHIP FEES AND SERVICE OF A PROFIT- MAXIMISING
MONOPOLISTIC NETWORK
The network considered in this section is economic, has a monopoly on providing a service, and
sets its membership fee and service level so as to maximise profit: the difference between the
sum of the members’ periodical membership payments and the network’s periodical operational
costs. In addition to a fixed cost
production costs,
members),

C1 ,

C0

the network has two types of variable costs: the service-

and the organisational costs (e.g., billing and communicating with

C2 .

Suppose that the service-production costs are quadratic in the level of service and affected by
the network size (i.e., network externalities) as displayed by the second term on the right-hand
side of the following equation

C1 = c1S 2 + c2 M
where c1 is a positive scalar, and

c2

(9)

is a scalar indicating the marginal network externalities,

which is positive if the provision of the service to member is adversely affected by the network
membership size because of a dominant congestion effect, but negative if the provision of the
service is enhanced by a dominant agglomeration effect, as in the case of matching networks.
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Suppose also that the organisational costs are proportional to the number of members

C2 = c3 M

(10)

where c3 is a positive scalar.

Then, the monopolistic network’s profit equation is

Π = (m − c2 − c3 ) M − c1S 2 − C0 .
By substituting the network’s density equation 5 for M and equation 7 for

(11)

pmax

into equation

11 the profit equation can be rendered as

 1− t 
2
Π = (m − c2 − c3 )[1 − 
 m] L − c1S − C0 .
 vS 
By differentiating

Π

(12)

with respect to m and setting the derivative to be equal to zero, the

monopolistic profit-maximising membership fee for a given network service is

 v 
m = 0.5
 S + 0.5(c2 + c3 ) .
 1− t 

(13)

In other words, for any given network’s service level the profit-maximising membership fee is
equal to half the marginal network’s externalities and organisational costs plus half the upperbound on members’ willingness to pay for the network’s service deflated by the effective cost of
a dollar spent as membership payment (i.e., one minus the tax-rebate rate). This relationship is
portrayed in Figure 4 by the profit-maximising membership-fee line (PMMFL).
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By substituting equation 13 for m into equation 12 and rearranging terms, the network’s profit
function can be concentrated on S

 (1 − t ) L (c2 + c3 ) 2  1
 vL 
Π = 0.25
 − c1S 2
 S + 0.25
1− t
v

S

− 0.5( c2 + c3 ) L − C0

.(14)

The monopolistic profit-maximising service should obey the first-order condition

dΠ
vL (1 − t ) L (c2 + c3 ) 2
=
−
− 8c1S* = 0 .
2
dS 1 − t
vS *

(15)

The second-order condition for maximum profit is satisfied as

d 2Π
dS

2

=

− 2(1 − t )(c2 + c3 ) 2
vS *

3

− 8c1 < 0 .

The monopolistic profit-maximising network service,

S *,

(16)

is obtained by solving the

polynomial 15. The corresponding membership fee is obtained by substituting

S*

into

equation 13. This profit-maximising combination of the monopolistic network’s service and
membership fee is indicated in Figure 2 by E .
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S
PMMFL

E
S*

ENL

Feasible combinations

(M>0)

0

m*

m

Figure 2. The monopolistic profit-maximising service
and membership fee
The total differentiation of the first-order condition 15 and the negative sign of the second-order
condition lead to the following claims about the properties of the monopolistic profit-maximising
service. (See the Appendix for proofs.)

Claim 1: The effects of the maximum marginal willingness to pay (v) and the tax-rebate rate (t)
on the service offered by the profit-maximising network are positive.
The underlying rationale is that the higher the upper-bound on the marginal willingness to pay
and the tax-rebate rate on membership payment, the lower the overall membership withdrawal
coefficient and hence the greater the network’s revenues and profit and its incentive to provide a
higher quality service.

Claim 2: The effect of the target population size on the monopolistic profit-maximising service
depends on the product of the marginal network externalities plus the marginal organisational
costs and the membership withdrawal coefficient. If initially this product is larger (smaller) than
the profit-maximising service, an increase in the target population size would raise (lower) the
level of the monopolistic profit-maximising service.
Note that in the case of a dominant agglomeration effect (i.e.,
increase in

L

c2 < 0 ) it is less likely that an

will raise the profit-maximising service level than in the case of a dominant

congestion effect.
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Claim 3: The higher the service-production costs’ coefficient, the lower the monopolistic
profit-maximising service.

Claim 4: The higher the marginal costs of the network externalities and organisation, the lower
the monopolistic profit-maximising service.

Claim 5: The effects of changes in the model’s parameters on the monopolistic profitmaximising membership fee have the same direction as the claimed effects on the monopolistic
profit-maximising service, and are amplified by the upper-bound on the marginal willingness to
pay and the tax-rebate rate.

V. MEMBERSHIP FEES AND SERVICE OF A BUDGET-BALANCING AND
DENSITY- TARGETING MONOPOLISTIC NETWORK
Let us now consider the membership fee and service levels set by a non-profit monopolistic
network so as to cover the costs of servicing its members and ensure a predetermined
membership percentage (i.e., density) target. This case is interesting as it is likely to be the
policy of some social networks, professional associations and trade unions.

Recalling the fixed costs, service production costs, network externalities’ costs and
organisational costs specified in the previous section, the balanced-budget constraint can be
displayed as:

C0 + c1S 2 + c2 M + c3 M = mM .

(17)

Consequently, the relationship between the service provided by the network and the budgetbalancing membership fee is
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S=

( m − c2 − c3 ) M − C0
c1

.

(18)

Moreover, in recalling the network-density equation 5 and equation 7, this relationship can be
rendered as

1− t 
( m − c2 − c3 )[1 − 
 m] L − C0
 vS 
S=
c1
(19)

or, equivalently, as

 ( m − c2 − c3 − C0 ) L 
(m − c2 − c3 )(1 − t ) L
S3 − 
= 0 . (20)
S +

c1

c1v
Consequently, the budget-balancing membership fee for any service level is given by

c1 3
1− t
S + ( c2 + c3 + C0 ) S − ( c2 + c3 )
v .
m= L
1− t
S−
v

(21)

By differentiating equation 21 it can be shown that the budget-balancing combinations of m and
S are located on a U-shaped balanced-budget curve as depicted in Figure 3. That is, up to a
critical membership fee the budget-balancing service level decreases but then rises.
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If in addition to balancing its budget the network sets the level of its service so as to achieve a
membership rate x, and if the ability to enjoy its service is uniformly distributed within the unit
interval, then the critical member has an ability of 1-x. Recalling equations 2 and 7, the network
ensures that a share of x of the target population joins its ranks by setting the membership fee
to be

 (1 − x ) v 
m=
S .
 1− t 

(22)

The set of all combinations of m and S ensuring x-membership rate is depicted by the xmembership-rate line in Figure 3.

The combinations of m and S satisfying simultaneously both the balanced-budget constraint and
the x-membership-rate target can be found by equating the terms on the right-hand sides of
equations 21 and 22. These combinations are found in the intersection between the balancedbudget curve and the x-membership-rate line as indicated by A and B in Figure 3. From the
members’ perspective, the positive service differential between B and A is a compensation for
the membership-fee differential between these combinations.
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S
Balanced-budget curve

x-membership-rate line
B

ENL
A

0

m

Figure 3. Budget-balancing and x-membership-rate
combinations

VI. EXTENSION TO DUOPOLISTIC NETWORKS: DENSITY AND THE
COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM
Let us now analyse networks’ density in an industry comprising two non-identical networks and
a population of potential customers that for reasons such as habit, loyalty and snobbism might
appreciate the service of the networks in a biased manner. Recalling equations 5 and 7, the
number of members affiliated to network 1 can be expressed as:

 1− t 
M1 = ( L − M 2 ) 1 −
m1 
v
S

1 1


(23)

and the number of members affiliated to network 2 is

 1− t

M 2 = ( L − M1 ) 1 −
m2 
 v2 S2


(24)
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where

v1

is not necessarily equal to

v2 because

of the aforementioned service-evaluation

biases.
By substituting equation 24 into equation 23 for

M 2 , solving for M1 and dividing by L , the

density of network 1 is:

m1




M1
v1S1
= 1− 

L
 m1 − (1 − t ) m1m2 + m2 
 v1S1
v1v 2 S1S2
v2 S2 

(25)

and, by symmetry, the density of network 2 is:

m2




M2
v2 S 2
= 1− 
.
m
(
1
−
t
)
m
m
m
L
1 2
 1 −
+ 2 
 v1S1
v1v 2 S1S 2
v 2 S2 
(26)

As can be intuitively expected, the differentiation of equations 25 and 26 implies that the density
of each network increases with its service level, its service assessment coefficient, and the
membership fee set by its rival and decreases with is own membership fee, the service level of
its rival, and the assessment coefficient of the service of its rival. The curves NET1 and NET2 in
Figure 4 display the relationship between network density and membership fee-service ratio for
network 1 and network 2, respectively for the case where

v1 > v2 .
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M/L
1

NET1
NET2

0

m/S

Figure 4. Networks’ density where v1

> v2

In recalling equations 11 and 25 the profit function of network 1 is



m1


v
S
1 1
L − c S2 − C
Π1 = (m1 − c21 − c31 ) 1 −
11 1
01

m1 (1 − t ) m1m2e
m2e 
−
+

e
e
v
S
v1v 2 S1S2
v 2 S2 

1 1
(27)
and in recalling equation 26 the profit function of network 2 is

Π 2 = (m2 − c22



m2


v
S
2 2
L − c S2 − C
− c32 ) 1 − e
12 2
02
e

m1
(1 − t )m1 m2
m2 
−
+


e
v 2 S2 
v1v 2 S1e S2
 v1S1
(28)

where the superscript e denotes expected values of the rival network’s control variables. The
Cournot-equilibrium membership fees and service levels are obtained by solving the combined
set of first-order conditions for network 1 and network 2 simultaneously under the assumption
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that the expected values are confirmed in equilibrium. That is,

m1* , m2* , S1*

and

S2*

satisfying simultaneously

∂Π 1
∂M1
= M1 + (m1 − c21 − c31 )
=0
∂m1
∂m1

(29a)

∂Π 1
∂M1
= (m1 − c21 − c31 )
− 2c11S1 = 0
∂S1
∂S1

(29b)

∂Π 2
∂M 2
= M2 + (m2 − c22 − c32 )
=0
∂m2
∂m2

(29c)

∂Π 2
∂M 2
= ( m2 − c22 − c32 )
− 2c12 S2 = 0
∂S2
∂S2

(29d)

where,

m1




v1S1
M1 = 1 −
L
m
(
1
−
t
)
m
m
m
1
1
2
2


−
+
 v1S1
v1v2 S1S2
v2 S2 

(30a)

and

m2




v2 S2
M2 = 1 −
L.
m
(
1
−
t
)
m
m
m
1
1
2
2


−
+
 v1S1
v1v 2 S1S2
v 2 S2 
Possible comparative statics’ results can be obtained through simulations.

(30b)
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VII. CONCLUSION
Membership fees and ability to enjoy a network service are incorporated into the individual’s
decision to join the network. The analysis started with a monopolistic network. The network
density was related to the distribution of the ability to enjoy the network service, membership
fees and tax concessions. It was shown that the network density declines linearly with the
membership fee. The decline in the network density stemming from an increase in the
membership fee is moderated by the upper bound on individuals’ willingness to pay for the
network service and the tax-rebate rate.
As the network density affects both the network revenues and organisational costs and
generates negative externalities due to congestion and positive ones due to greater opportunities
for interaction among members, its determination was integrated into the analysis of the choice
of membership fee and service by a profit-maximising monopolistic network and, alternatively,
by a non-profit monopolistic network that balances its budget and seeks the affiliation of a
desired share of the target population.
The substitution of the aforementioned linear relationship between network density and
membership fee into a profit-maximising objective function implied that for any given network
service level the profit-maximising membership fee is equal to half the marginal network
externalities and organisational costs plus half the upper-bound on members’ willingness to pay
for the network service deflated by the effective cost of a dollar spent on membership payment.
The effect of the overall membership withdrawal coefficient on the level of service offered by a
profit-maximising network was found to be negative. Moreover, the higher the members’ ability
to enjoy the network service and the higher the tax-rebate rate on membership payment, the
greater the profit-maximising service. The effect of the target population size on the level of the
profit-maximising service was found to depend on the product of the marginal organisational
costs and the membership withdrawal coefficient. It was argued that if initially the
aforementioned product is larger (smaller) than the profit-maximising service an increase in the
target population size would raise (lower) the profit-maximising service level. It was shown that
the higher the marginal service-production costs and the marginal organisational costs the lower
the profit-maximising service level. It was also argued that the effects of changes in the model’s
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parameters on the profit-maximising membership fee have the same directions as the
aforementioned effects on the profit-maximising service and are amplified by the upper-bound
willingness to pay coefficient and the tax-rebate rate.

By substituting the linear relationship between the network density and membership fee into a
budget-balancing objective it was shown that the budget-balancing combinations of membership
fee and service are located on a U-shaped curve. That is, up to a critical level the positive effect
of an increase in the budget-balancing membership fee on the network revenues is outweighed
by the negative effect of diminishing network density on the network revenues and hence forcing
the network to reduce costs by lowering the service quality. Beyond that critical level the
positive effect of an increase in the budget-balancing membership fee on the network revenues
outweighs the negative effect of declining network density on the network’s revenues and hence
enables the budget-balancing network to raise the quality of service. In turn, an improvement in
the network’s service is necessary for increasing the target population’s willingness to pay. It
was argued that if the network sets the level of its service so as to achieve a target membership
rate, the locus of all combinations of membership fee and service rate will be a positively sloped
line. The intersection of this line with the U-shaped balanced-budget curve indicates the
combinations of membership fee and service quality satisfying both the target network density
and balanced budget.
The analysis was extended to the more complicated case of two non-identical rival networks.
The effects of the a network’s own choice, and the rival’s choice, of membership fees and
service on its density were analysed. The Cournot-equilibrium membership fees and service
were described for profit-maximising networks.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Usually networks are characterised by positive size externalities commonly called “network
externalities”, indicating that the benefits stemming from the addition of an extra node or
member exceed the private benefits accruing to that node or member.
2. Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) analysed further whether the tension between stability and
efficiency can be resolved.
3. See for example McDonald and Suen (1992) and Levy (1998), who have analysed the
relationship between trade union bargaining power and density.
4. For example, Cohen and Zilberman (1997) argue that lack of familiarity with a new
technology and strategic behaviour led to underestimates of farmers’ actual willingness to pay
for the Californian statewide network of weather information.
5. The use of the normal distribution as an approximation of

f

could introduce interesting

factors such as the mean and variance of the capacity to enjoy the network service. However,
the incorporation of the normal distribution is inconsistent with the requirement that
θi ∈( 0,1) .
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APPENDIX
Proof of claim 1:

dS *
[(( c2 + c3 ) 2 / S *2 ) + (v 2 / (1 − t ) 2 )] L
=
< 0.
2
2
1− t 
d Π / dS
d

 v 

Proof of claim 2:

 (c2 + c3 ) 2 (1 − t )
v 
−

2
dS * 
1− t  > 0
vS
=
=
dL 
d 2Π
<


dS 2

Proof of claim 3:

as

<
(1 − t ) 
S * = ( c2 + c3 )
.
>
v 

dS *
8S *
= 2
< 0.
dc1 d Π / dS 2

Proof of claim 4:

2(1 − t ) L( c2 + c3 )
dS *
=
d ( c2 + c3 )

vS *2
d 2Π

< 0.

dS 2
Proof of claim 5: By virtue of equation 13 the profit-maximising membership fee is positively
related to the network’s service level.
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